题 目：A STUDY OF HYBRID COORDINATION MECHANISMS FOR SCHEDULING GAMES UNDER A GRADE OF SERVICE

主讲人：李好好副教授

时 间：2021年10月28日（周四）13:30-14:30

地 点：6号楼500会议室

主办单位：银河7163官网 浙江省2011“数据科学与大数据分析协同创新中心”

摘要：

Scheduling games under hybrid coordination mechanisms in which m parallel machines are allowed to follow different policies. We present an algorithm to show that Nash equilibriums always exist. For scheduling games with grade of service (GoS), we consider two kinds of hybrid coordination mechanisms with LG (Lowest Grade first) policy and HG (Highest Grade first) policy. The first one enables every machine to choose either LG policy or HG policy independently. The second hybrid coordination mechanism requires the first h machines follow one policy and the last m-h machines follow the other. Inefficiency of Nash equilibria is also evaluated when the social cost is minimizing the makespan by estimating the Price of Anarchy.

主讲人简介：

李好好，博士研究生，现任银河7163官网副教授，硕士生导师。主要研究领域为运筹学、线性及非线性优化与控制等，研究成果在Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics、Linear and Multilinear Algebra、Linear Algebra and its Application、系统科学与数学等SCI杂志和国家一级期刊上发表近20篇，主持（完成）国家自然科学基金项目2项，，浙江省自然科学基金项目1项。担任浙江省自然科学基金通讯评审专家；广东省自然科学基金通讯评审专家，美国《数学评论》评论员，国内外多个高水平学术期刊的匿名审稿人。

欢迎各位老师和同学踊跃参加！